Belgian Infant Formula Blamed for Sick Russian Babies

Implicated dry milk formula also shipped to Haiti and to several African countries.

Powdered infant formula manufactured by a Belgian company is responsible for 16 cases of salmonellosis in Usolie (Omsk, Irkutsk, Russia), according to a report carried on ProMED mail. The illnesses occurred between November 2, 2011 and January 13, 2012.

Thirteen of the outbreak victims were children aged 2 weeks to 7 months; one was a 4-year old child, and two victims were adults aged 24 and 29 years. All sixteen confirmed victims were infected with Salmonella Oranienburg.

The implicated milk was identified as “Damil a” dry milk formula. It was manufactured in Belgium by FASSKA S.A., and distributed in the Russian Federation by JSC “STI Damil” (Moscow). The implicated batch of dry milk formula carried a date of manufacture of 01.2011.

The Russian distributor has recalled the dry milk formula, which was supplied to wholesale suppliers, large retail chains, pharmacies and health care institutions. In addition, Baku Today reports that the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation for the Irkutsk region has instituted proceedings under Article 2h 238 of the Criminal Code, on the grounds that the “production, storage, transport or marketing of goods and products do not meet the requirements of security.”

Belgium has notified the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (“RASFF” – Notification #2012.0094, issued 17/01/2012 and updated 20/01/2012) that dry milk infant formula linked to an outbreak of Salmonella Oranienburg was supplied to Burundi, The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Congo-Brazzaville, Haiti, Mozambique and the Russian Federation. I have been unable to find any reports of Salmonella Oranienburg illnesses from countries other than Russia.

As usual, the official public notification through RASFF did not identify the manufacturer or brand of the product for which the foodborne outbreak alert was issued. But the coincidence is compelling.

Fasska distributes its products worldwide, and boasts that attention to quality is a “constant obsession that guides each action made and decision taken…” within the company. A statement explaining what steps the company was taking to get to the bottom of the contamination and prevent a reoccurrence would be appropriate – as would a statement from the Belgian government that it was undertaking an investigation of the manufacturing facility.

Russian consumers who have purchased the dry milk powder infant formula have been instructed to return it to the place of purchase and to inform the Omsk region Rospotrebnadzor (regulatory authority).

Guest Blog: Safe Employees = Safe Food

The following Guest Blog first appeared on Marler Blog, and is reproduced here with the kind permission of its author, Bill Marler.

Safe Employees = Safe Food

When AP reported this week that an owner of Jensen Farms was being fined by the U.S. Department of Labor for failing to provide safe migrant worker housing, I must admit even I was a bit shocked. Could it be that an owner of a business that allowed the deadly fecal bacteria Listeria to coat its product would also treat its employees like crap too?

Well, apparently yes. It seems that Eric Jensen, the Colorado Cantaloupe grower that caused an outbreak that killed 30 (by my count 32) – sickening a total of 146 – people, rented migrant workers unsanitary, overcrowded rooms at a motel he owns. Inspectors said many rooms lacked beds, laundry facilities and smoke detectors. Jensen now faces a whopping $4,250 in civil penalties. As the Department’s Denver director said:

“Profiting at the expense of vulnerable workers is not just inhumane, it’s illegal.”

I would add immoral and really, really stupid – especially when it comes to producing safe food.

Less we forget, the FDA and the staff of the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee found a number of safety lapses at Jensen Farms that likely led to the outbreak:

  • Condensation from cooling systems draining directly onto the floor,
  • Poor drainage resulting in water pooling around the food processing equipment,
  • Inappropriate food processing equipment which was difficult to clean (i.e., Listeria found on the felt roller brushes),
  • No antimicrobial solution, such as chlorine, in the water used to wash the cantaloupes,
  • No equipment to remove field heat from the cantaloupes before they were placed into 
cold storage, and
  • FDA officials were highly critical of the processing methods used at Jensen Farms. According to these FDA officials, the probable causes of the melon contamination at Jensen Farms included “serious design flaws” in the processing technique used at Jensen Farms, “poor sanitary design of the facility itself,” and “lack of awareness of food safety standards by Jensen Farms.” In particular, FDA emphasized to Committee staff that the processing equipment and the decision not to chlorinate the water used to wash the cantaloupes were two probable causes of the contamination.

Hmm, does this sound familiar to you? Remember the sickening of 1939 people with Salmonella and the recall of 500,000,000 eggs in 2010 linked to Iowa’s Wright County Egg? Who could forget the FDA inspection report highlights of some of its findings at Wright County:

  • Chicken manure located in the manure pits below the egg laying operations was observed to be approximately 4 feet high to 8 feet high at the following locations: Layer 1 – House 1; Layer 3 – Houses 2, 7, 17, and 18. The outside access doors to the manure pits at these locations had been pushed out by the weight of the manure, leaving open access to wildlife or domesticated animals,
  • Un-baited, unsealed holes appearing to be rodent burrows located along the second floor baseboards were observed inside Layer 1 – Houses 1-9 and 11-13; Layer 2 – Houses 7 and 11; Layer 3 – Houses 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6; Layer 4 – House 3,
  • Dark liquid which appeared to be manure was observed seeping through the concrete foundation to the outside of the laying houses at the following locations: Layer 1 – Houses 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 11, 12, and 14; and Layer 3 – Houses 1, 8, 13, and 17,
  • Standing water approximately 3 inches deep was observed at the southeast corner of the manure pit located inside Layer 1 – House 13,
  • Un-caged birds (chickens having escaped) were observed in the egg laying operations in contact with the egg laying birds at Layer 3 – Houses 9 and 16. The un-caged birds were using the manure, which was approximately 8 feet high, to access the egg laying area,
  • Layer 3 – House 11, the house entrance door to access both House 11 and 12 was blocked with excessive amounts of manure in the manure pits,
  • There were between 2 to 5 live mice observed inside the egg laying Houses 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, and 14, and
  • Live and dead flies too numerous to count were observed at the following locations inside the egg laying houses: Layer 1 – Houses 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 11, and 12; Layer 2 – Houses 7 and 11; Layer 3 – Houses 3, 4, 4, 5, 7, 8, 15, 16, 17, and 18. The live flies were on and around egg belts, feed, shell eggs and walkways in the different sections of each egg laying area. In addition, live and dead maggots too numerous to count were observed on the manure pit floor located in Layer 2 – House 7.

And, guess what else – the owner of Wright County, Jack DeCoster, cared little for his employees too. A few examples:

  • In 1997, DeCoster Egg Farms agreed to pay $2 million in fines to settle citations brought in 1996 for health and safety violations at DeCoster’s farm in Turner, Maine. Then-Labor Secretary Robert Reich said conditions were:

“As dangerous and oppressive as any sweatshop.”

  • In 2002, the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission announced a more than $1.5 million settlement of an employment discrimination lawsuit against DeCoster Farms on behalf of Mexican women who reported they were subjected to sexual harassment, including rape, abuse and retaliation by some supervisory workers at DeCoster’s Wright County plants.

And, who can forget Stewart Parnell and the Peanut Corporation of America Salmonella outbreak of 2009 that sickened 714 persons in 46 states – killing nine. The FDA reported that the company shipped tainted products under three conditions: (1) without retesting, (2) before the re-test results came back from an outside company, and (3) after a second test showed no bacterial contamination.

As one PCA employee was quoted as saying:

“I never ate the peanut butter, and I wouldn’t allow my kids to eat it.”

My strong suspicion is that Jensen Farm workers were not eating Jensen Farm cantaloupes as they sat in their overcrowded hotel rooms. And, I would be willing to bet that Wright County employees were not taking a dozen eggs home to the family from work.

Perhaps there is a lesson here? Perhaps how you treat your employees, and how the employee feels about the product, says volumes about the quality and safety of the product? If the employees will not eat the product, perhaps that products should simply not be sold.

About the author: Bill Marler is a personal injury and products liability attorney, and an internationally known food safety advocate. He began litigating foodborne illness cases in 1993, when he represented Brianne Kiner, the most seriously injured survivor of the Jack in the Box E. coli O157:H7 outbreak. Bill is a graduate of the Seattle University School of Law, and the Law School’s “Lawyer in Residence.”

An Open Letter To The U.S. CDC

Last week, CDC released two “Final Update” reports on Salmonella outbreak investigations within a 48-hour period.

The first report, released on January 17th, summarized the results of an investigation into a 10-month long outbreak of Salmonella Typhimurium associated with exposure to clinical and teaching microbiology laboratories. The second report, released on January 19th, presented the results of an investigation into a 2-month long multi-state outbreak of Salmonella Enteritidis infections linked to a restaurant chain.

These two outbreaks had very little in common with each other; the outbreak settings were different, the scope and duration of the outbreaks were different, and the source of the infections was different. Nevertheless, the two outbreaks have one very important thing in common.

CDC, in conjunction with at least some of its public health partners at the state and local level, has chosen to withhold important information from the public.

What information has CDC withheld, and why should this information be released? Here is a list of questions that I sent to my media contact at CDC on January 18th, the day after the Salmonella Typhimurium outbreak report was released.

  1. Is there a specific reason why CDC is not specifying the identity of the commercial strain of Salmonella Typhimurium that is associated with this outbreak (by the ATCC or NCTC strain number – not the commercial supplier)? Can you provide me with the strain number ID?
  2. Does CDC have any hypothesis as to the trigger for this outbreak? Most of the commercial strains have been in use in various labs for many years. What may have happened to initiate the increase in cases? What determined the start date? With a baseline rate for the outbreak strain of 0 to 4 reports/week, how were the start and ending date established for this outbreak?
  3. Were the outbreak cases all tied to the same commercial source of the S. Typhimurium “Strain X”?
  4. Were the outbreak cases tied to the use of a specific format of the commercial source (for example, Bacti-discs or pre-filled inoculation loops)?
  5. Have any cases involving this same strain been reported to CDC since the last “outbreak” case on June 29, 2011? If so, how has CDC differentiated those cases from the outbreak cases (keeping in mind the baseline of 0-4 cases per week mentioned in the CDC report).
  6. Were the bulk of the cases linked to student labs or to clinical labs?

To these questions, I would now add, “Were the clinical lab cases tied mainly to in-hospital labs, or to free-standing commercial clinical labs? If the latter, was any single commercial lab chain disproportionately involved?

When the Salmonella Enteritidis restaurant chain outbreak report hit the internet, I again contacted my CDC media liaison and asked, “Can you please explain why CDC has not revealed the name of the restaurant chain implicated in the above-mentioned outbreak? Even better, can you identify the chain by name?

I realize that both outbreaks are “over” and that at least some of this information now is academic. Nevertheless, I question CDC’s actions in withholding information that could influence purchasing decisions on the part of consumers and of medical and lab professionals.

CDC reported on January 19th that Restaurant Chain A’s handling and cooking processes likely ruled out ground beef as a source of the Salmonella Enteritidis outbreak. This is favorable to the restaurant chain, and would give consumers comfort that the restaurants belonging to this fast food chain are following appropriate food-handling procedures – if only CDC had released the name of the chain.

As for the lab-related outbreak, if I was still running a microbiology lab, I would certainly want to know whether a specific packaging or format of commercially available control culture was more prone to contaminating the lab surroundings than others. I would opt to avoid this format, if I had the information and the choice. Likewise, as a medical doctor, I would opt to avoid a commercial clinical lab chain that was prone to in-lab contamination.

If either of these outbreaks had been traced to a specific packaged food, the offending food would have been named. There is no logical reason for restaurant-linked outbreaks to be handled differently. There is no logical reason for a lab-related outbreak to be handled differently.

I would appreciate receiving substantive answers to my questions.

Sincerely yours,

Phyllis Entis, MSc., SM(NRCM)
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